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The Choquet integral has been applied to many areas of decision making and in particular
in the context of decision under uncertainty. The Choquet integral have been extensively
studied in the ¯eld of multicriteria decision aid, fuzzy sets, aggregation theory.
Nevertheless every non-monotonic measure is unable to represent the neutralization e®ect, a
situations where increasing two criteria by alone has a positive e®ect, but the contemporary
increasing of both of them has a negative e®ect (the same can happen also for more than two
criteria). This case is di®erent, and stronger, in some sense, than the so called redundance
e®ect represented by monotonic sub-additive measures. The specialized literature usually
considers interchangeable the terms redundance and con°icting, both referring to the sub-
additive case. But in this paper we reserve the term con°icting for the neutralization case,
represented by non-monotonic measures. Note that, in boolean logic, the neutralization
e®ect corresponds to the Exclusive Or connective (EXOR). Even if not often observed,
the neutralization case can be of interest in real world MADA problems (Multi Attribute
Decision Aid). Considering for instance an environmental decision making problem, where a
Decision Maker (DM) has to rank some contaminated sites, considering both toxic sampled
data and socio-economics indices. It can be unclear if an economic index is a criterion or a
bene¯t, given that it can be preferable to decontaminate a site economically well developed,
if the DM intends to preserve the economical activity, or the contrary if he/she wants to
favor the sustainable development for a depressed area. An other typical MADA problem
quite cited in the literature concerns the candidate selection for a particular jobs [5]. Even
here, a very high specialization in a single item only, can be considered unfavorable with
respect to a lower specialization but equally distributed in all the items. A justi¯cation for
this choice is that a beginner can be better instructed in all the items than a deeply expert
in a single item only, This is due to the fact that usually he maintains a very high auto-
estimation, con°icting with the correct behavior for a beginner. Moreover again, optimizing
an expenditure basket, we usually do not assign all the budget to a single good. This can be
worst that buy anything, thus saving the total money amount, but the null option is worst
again that a budget allocation to di®erentiated items. All such situations appear when one
(or more) criterion in a coalition acts as a criterion, in an other one as a bene¯t. Of course,
such a situation cannot be represented by non-monotonic measures.
The contributions in the nowadays literature in the ¯eld of non-monotonic measure is quite
scarce, we limit to quote few papers about. De Waegenaere and Wakker [4] consider non-
monotonic Choquet integrals in the study of intertemporal preferences, while Murofushi et
al. [9] furnish a theoretical contribution. Radojevi^ c uses non-monotonic measures [10] in the
context of logical measures. Also the paper of R¶ ebill¶ e [11] gives interesting contributions.
No many other papers exist in the ¯eld of non-monotonic measure, especially for MSDA
applications.
In this paper we propose an axiomatic characterization by means of rather natural properties
of the class of nonmonotone Choquet integral and we show that non-monotonic Choquet
integrals are meaningful as aggregation operators. The structure of the paper is as follows.
2In Section 1 we introduce some properties of aggregation functions, we recall the de¯nition of
capacity and of discrete Choquet integral and we introduce the axiomatic characterization.
Section 2 deals with the representation in the dual space while in Section 3 we consider the
Shapley index in the non-monotonic case. The paper ¯nishes with some conclusions.
1 A characterization of non-monotonic Choquet integral
Aggregation has for purpose the simultaneous use of di®erent pieces of information provided
by several sources, in order to come to a conclusion or a decision so aggregation functions
transform a ¯nite number of inputs, called arguments, into a single output. They are ap-
plied in many di®erent domains and in particular aggregation functions play important
role in di®erent approaches to decision making, where values to be aggregated are typically
preference or satisfaction degrees. Many functions of di®erent type have been considered
in connection with di®erent situations and various properties of these functionals can be
imposed by the nature of the considered aggregation problem. A class of aggregation func-
tions can also be introduced axiomatically by means of a set of properties.
We denote by E a non empty real interval. If the integer n represents the number of values
to be aggregated an aggregation operator is a function A : En ! E. To motivate the use
of the Choquet integral as an aggregation operator, we present some basic mathematical
properties of the aggregation functions.
² Monotonicity For all x;y 2 En if xi · yi (i = 1;:::;n) then A(x) · A(y)
² Idempotence If x 2 E then A(x;:::;x) = x
² Positive Homogeneity If x 2 En and a 2 R;a > 0 then A(ax) = aAx
Moreover we de¯ne x¡i the element of Rn¡1 that is obtained from x by eliminating com-
ponent i, and let (x¡i;yi) obtained from x by replacing xi with yi.
Now we present the concept of comonotonicity.
De¯nition 1.1 If x;y are elements of Rn then x;y are said comonotonic if xi < xj implies
that yi · yj.
Two vectors x;y are comonotonic if they have the same ranking of their components or
there exists a permutation ¾ de¯ned on such that x;y are solution of the equation :
t¾(1) ¸ t¾(2) ¸ :::::: ¸ t¾(n)
Our representation result depend on the following axioms related to the concept of comono-
tonicity..
² Comonotonic Monotonicity If x;y 2 En are comonotonic and xi · yi
(i = 1;:::;n) then A(x) · A(y)
3² Comonotonic Separability If x;y 2 Enare comonotonic then for every i,
A(x¡i;xi) ¸ A(y¡i;xi) i® A(x¡i;yi) ¸ A(y¡i;yi)
The comonotonic separability axiom is obviously a variation of an additive separability ax-
iom and it has been applied successfully in decision making under risk and uncertainty . It
states that preferences between alternatives depend only on the components that di®er be-
tween the vectors under consideration, as long as these alternatives maintain the attributes'
ordering.
In order to introduce a nonadditive approach to aggregation operators we introduce a non-
additive integral operator and so we consider the integral as a particular averaging operator
Due to the context we restrict ourself to the discrete case and and for a comprehensive
treatments of nonadditive integration we refer to [2]. As is well known the Choquet integral
has been extensively applied in the context of decision under uncertainty.
In this context the Choquet integral may be viewed as a way of aggregating utility across
di®erent states in order to arrive to a decision criterion while in multicriteria decision mak-
ing the nonadditive integral operator is a tool for aggregating over di®erent criteria. The use
of variants of the Choquet integral allows some °exibility in the way criteria are combined.
In particular in this paper we consider a non-monotonic Choquet integral as in
As in [9] and [4] we de¯ne a non-monotonic Choquet measure on 2N and a Choquet integral
for a n-dimensional vector. We consider a ¯nite index set N = f1;:::;ng and we use the
following de¯nitions.
De¯nition 1.2 A set function À : 2N ! R with À(;) = 0 is called a non-monotonic
nonadditive measure. À is normalized if À(N) = 1. If A µ B µ N implies that À(A) · À(B)
the function is said to be a nonadditive measure.
We note that if S µ N, À(S) can be viewed as the importance of the set of elements S.
Note also that non-monotonic nonadditive measures encompass probability measures, belief
functions and capacity.
We introduce now the discrete Choquet integral on N viewed as aggregation function.
De¯nition 1.3 Let À a non-monotonic nonadditive measure À : 2N ! R , x 2 Rnand
¼¾(j) = À(f¾(1);::::::;¾(j)g) ¡ À(f¾(1);::::::;¾(j ¡ 1)g) (1)







The Choquet integral has important properties for aggregation.
Proposition 1.1 Let A an aggregation function de¯ned on En.
4² i) If A is a nonmonotone Choquet integral it is positive homogeneous, comonotonic
monotone and comonotonic additive. If the measure is normalized then A is idempo-
tent.
² ii) A is a nonmonotone Choquet integral if satisfy positive homogeneity and comono-
tonic separability.
² iii) A is a nonmonotone Choquet integral if is continuous and comonotonic additive.
Proof The proof of part i) is immediate by the de¯nition of Choquet integral.
Now it is important to note that a comonotonic separable aggregation function A is comono-
tonic additive that is if x;y 2 En are comonotonic then A(x + y) = A(x) + A(y).
In fact if x;y;z 2 En are comonotonic and A(x) ¸ A(y) then by comonotonic separa-
bility A(x + z) ¸ A(y + z). Then if we consider two comonotonic vectors x;y;z 2 En
there exist c;d 2 E such that A(x) = c = (c;:::;c) and A(y) = d = (d;:::;d). By the
fact that each comonotonic vector is comonotonic with each other vector we can prove
A(x+y) = A(c+y) = A(c+d) = A(c)+A(d) = A(x)+A(y). Now we can conclude since
a homogeneous function that satis¯es comonotonic additivity is a nonmonotone Choquet
integral by theorem 1 of [6] and a continuous function that satis¯es comonotonic additivity
is a nonmonotone Choquet integral by corollary 2.2 of [11].
It is elementary veri¯ed that if A satis¯es the hypothesis of proposition 1.1 and it is also
monotone then it is a Choquet integral.
2 MÄ obius transform
Each monotonic nonadditive measure ¹(T) biunivocally corresponds to its dual set ®(S) :




(¡1)s¡t¹(T);8T µ S (3)




®(S);8T µ S (4)
From the monotonicity conditions it follows that not any 2n real values is the dual set of







®(T) ¸ 0; (5)
5Moreover, for n = 1 we have immediately that ¹(i) = ®(i);8i = 1;::;n. The sign of the
values ® has a clear interpretation: a positive value of ®(S) means that the coalition S is
synergic, that is, the e®ect of such a coalition in the aggregated function in greater than
then the sum of the e®ects of the singletons belonging to S. The contrary holds if ®(S) < 0,
while if ®(S) = 0 there is no interactions among the criteria in S, and the Choquet integral
collapses into the WA aggregation function (Weighted Averaging).








This formulation is very useful in most of practical cases. If the measure is additive the
values ®(S) satisfy ¡1 · ®(S) · 1, and the tendency to synergy increases as most as ®(S)
tends to 1 (the contrary holds if ®(S) < 0). But in the case of non-monotonic measure, this
constraints holds no more. Nevertheless, we can assert the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.1 For every nonadditive non-monotonic measure ¹(S), S µ N, the dual
values ®(S) satisfy the following bounds:
1 ¡ 2s · ®(S) · 2s ¡ 1 (7)
where s = card(S).
Proof From (3), the value ®(S) is obtained by summing the measures included in T,
¹(T), T µ S, multiplied by ¡1 if (s ¡ t) is odd. Those measures are in the number of 2n.
For the upper bound, let us observe that, being null the measure of the empty set, it is
su±cient to set ¹(T) = 1 if (s ¡ t) is even, and ¹(T) = ¡1 if (s ¡ t) is odd; this choice is
admissible since the measure in not necessarily monotone. In so doing, all the 2n terms in
the summation are equal to one (except the null term corresponding to the empty set), and
thus we obtain immediately the upper bound. For the lower one, we proceed in the same
way, interchanging the sign between the terms with odd and even cardinality.
Clearly, also for non-monotonic measure, if 0 < ®(S) < 1 we can say that we have a synergic
e®ect and if ¡1 < ®(S) < 0 we have a redundance e®ect. But if ®(S) < ¡1 (and ¸ 1 ¡ 2n)
we have a con°icting e®ect, lower than the redundance one, see note (1). And if ®(S) > 1
the coalition exhibits a reinforcement e®ect, higher than the synergic e®ect. This e®ect can
be observed if a set of criteria, considered as cost (bene¯t) by alone, that is, with negative
weights, when considered together, appear as bene¯t. Of course, this fact can exist only
with non-monotonic measures. To distinguish it from the synergic behavior, we name it as
super-synergic e®ect.
63 Shapley index for criterion characterization: cost or bene-
¯t?
One of the most important problem when dealing with non additive measures is the con-
cept of relative importance of a criterion. The following Shapley index, [5], [7], measures
the average importance of a criterion, taking all the interactions with the other criteria into
account. In this sense, it is an extension of the concept of weight for the WA approach.
For a give criterion, the Shapley index averages all the marginal gains considering all the
possible coalitions including the criterion. It is then normalizes between 0 and 1. If the
Shapley index equals 0 it means that, in average, the "weight" of the criterion is null (it
has no importance), while if it equals 1 it has a very high (relative) importance. In fact, it
can happen that the measure of the singleton is very low, but when the criterion is merged
inside a coalition including other ones, its marginal contribution becomes very high. The
formal de¯nition of the Shapley index is the following one:
De¯nition 3.1 Let ¹ be a nonadditive monotonic measure, ¹ : 2n ! [0;1], the Shapley




(n ¡ t ¡ 1)!t!
n!
[¹(T [ i) ¡ ¹(T)] (8)
where t = card(T).
The Shapley index varies between 0 (the criterion exhibits a null importance) and 1 (the
criterion exhibits a complete importance). Indeed1, this index in nothing else that the av-
erage marginal gain obtained to the insertion of the considered criterion in a coalition, and,
given the monotonicity, each marginal contribution is in between 0 and 1.
But what happen for a non-monotonic measure? The Shapley index can be similarly
de¯ned, but in this case it belongs to [¡1;1]. The meaning of the sign is clear. For positive
values, the corresponding criterion has to be considered, in average, as a bene¯t, conversely,
for negative values, it represents a cost. In fact, given that the de¯nition remains the same
as for monotonic measures, we can assert the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1 For a non-monotonic measures ¹, the Shapley values v(i) of each crite-
rion is in between ¡1 and +1.
Proof From the de¯nition (8), it holds for the i ¡ th criterion:
1The Shapley index can be computed also to every subset of criteria, instead that a sigle criterion only,
obtaining the so called Shapley interaction index. An other index is the Banzhaf index. We do not address
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being k(t) =
((n¡1)¡t)!t!
(n¡1)! , combinations of n objects taken t at a time, the number of subsets
of Nni with cardinality t. Such a value is minimum as soon as ¹(T [i) = 0;¹(T) = 1, that
is if:
¹(T) = 0;8T µ Nni
¹(S) = 1;8S µ N : i 2 S




















[¹(T [ i) ¡ ¹(T)]g = ¡1 (9)
The upper bound (+1) can be computed in the same way.
Given the construction of the index, its interpretation is obvious. If it equals +1, the cor-
responding "weight" has the possible maximum value, and the criterion is, in average with
all the possible coalitions, a "complete" bene¯t. The contrary holds if v(i) equals -1, that
is, the i ¡ th criterion is a "complete" cost criterion. While if v(i) = 0 the importance of
the criterion is null (in average). Of course, in all the other possible intermediate situation,
if the value of the criterion is close to zero, if positive it is a bene¯t with low importance, if
negative it is a cost (again, with low importance). The same if v(i) is close to ¡1 or to 1.
Thus we can answer to the question we posed at the beginning; a criterion cannot a priori
be classi¯ed as a bene¯t or a cost. Its e®ect depends on its marginal contribution (positive
or negative) to all the coalitions including itself. If, in average, this marginal contribution
is positive, we can say that it is a bene¯t, on the contrary, it represents a cost.
Consider the following example. We have 3 criteria, a;b;c and the following measure is
de¯ned over every of the 2n = 23 = 8 possible coalition:
8¹(;) = 0;¹(a) = 0:4;¹(b) = 0:5;¹(c) = 0:6;¹(a;b) = 1;¹(a;c) = ¡0:1;¹(b;c) = ¡0:8;¹(a;b;c) = 0
Clearly, the measure in non monotone. A simple computation shows:
v(1) = 0:4 +
1
2
(1 ¡ 1) = 0:4
v(2) = 0:5 +
1
2
(1 ¡ 0:8) = 0:4
v(3) = 0:6 +
1
2
(¡0:8 ¡ 1) = ¡0:3
Thus the third criterion, being considered as a bene¯t is taken by alone (its weight is 0.6)
has a negative Shapley index, meaning that, in averaging, it acts as a cost, decreasing the
value of the coalitions including it. Such an information can be useful when dealing with
contrasting criteria, since the sentence "this criterion is a bene¯t" maybe supported by its
"relative importance" can be uncorrect and due to a myopic view; the "importance" of a
criterion, and thus its "true nature" as bene¯t or as cost needs to be evaluated considering
all the possible coalition including it.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we described the the Choquet integral with non-monotonic measures. We give
an axiomatic characterization, and showed how also this operator can be computed in the
dual space. Next we showed how the Shapley index can be used also to measure how much
a criterion can be in average intended as a bene¯t or a cost. As a future improvement we
intend to de¯ne an algorithmic procedure to identify the value of the measures using an
implicit approach based on suitably designed questionnaire, following the idea proposed by
[3] and recently applied in a real world application, see ([1]).
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